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I. Introduction 
Observers of the global judicialization of politics have noted the spread 
of constitutional courts around the world, which made their appearance in 
early twentieth-century Europe1 and became seemingly required practice 
thereafter in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.2  The paradigmatic power of 
these courts is constitutional review, in which a court evaluates legislation, 
administrative action, or an international treaty for compatibility with the 
written constitution.  It is natural that writers on the new constitutional courts 
have concentrated attention on judicial review, for it is here that the courts’ 
lawmaking power is at its apex.  Relatively free of the threat of correction 
from other political actors, courts exercising judicial review are rather obvi-
ously policy-making bodies.  But in their understandable eagerness to assess 
new systems of review, scholars have paid little attention to the other func-
tions of constitutional courts—functions that potentially alter the status and 
effectiveness of the bodies. 
This Article is concerned with what we call the ancillary powers of 
constitutional courts—those powers that fall outside the prototypical 
constitutional-review function described above.  Perhaps because of the 
prominence of constitutional courts and their function of reviewing legisla-
tion and government action, constitution drafters have given new courts a 
wide range of other tasks ranging from impeachment to certifying states of 
emergency.  Just as Martin Shapiro has argued that scholars of American law 
and courts have paid too much attention to judicial review,3 scholars of the 
 
 *  Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.  This Article draws on data from the 
authors’ joint database effort, the Comparative Constitutions Project, available at http://www. 
comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/.  The authors would like to thank the National Science 
Foundation, Award No. SES 0648288 for support of that project.  Thanks also to David Law, H.W. 
Perry, Miguel Schor, and participants at the Texas Law Review symposium for helpful comments. 
 ** Assistant Professor, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin. 
1. See Torbjörn Vallinder, When the Courts Go Marching In, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF 
JUDICIAL POWER 13, 23 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 1995) (describing Austria’s 
adoption of Hans Kelsen’s BV-G constitutional text in 1920, which established a national court 
equipped with the power of judicial review). 
2. See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Politics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND POLITICS 119, 126–27 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008) (describing how judicial bodies 
in countries throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America have played an increasingly crucial role in 
electoral processes and political accountability movements, and identifying specific countries that 
have adopted constitutional courts). 
3. See Martin Shapiro, Public Law and Judicial Politics, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF 
THE DISCIPLINE II 365, 365–66 (Ada W. Finifter ed., 1993) (lamenting that public-law scholarship 
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new constitutional courts also risk an incomplete understanding of courts as 
political institutions if they ignore these other powers of constitutional courts, 
which often place the courts in the midst of politically charged controversies.  
This Article is a first attempt to call attention to these powers as a set.  It de-
scribes the powers, documents trends over time, and speculates as to the 
political consequences of assigning courts tasks beyond judicial review. 
We do not mean anything pejorative by labeling these powers ancillary.  
As a historical matter, the earliest constitutional power of courts was that of 
judicial review.4  The powers considered here arise later as a historical 
matter, and hence can be labeled ancillary in this sense.  Furthermore, none 
of the powers considered here is seen as essential to the definition of a court 
as a constitutional adjudicator.  The defining function of a constitutional 
court is constitutional review, and other powers may be bundled with that 
function, but need not be.  As we will see, the ancillary powers vary in the 
extent to which they require the court to refer to a constitutional text, and 
some of them do not involve the constitution even nominally.  But 
paradoxically, the involvement of courts in ancillary tasks has the potential to 
undermine their ability to conduct effective constitutional review, precisely 
because it pulls them into political conflicts. 
The Article is organized as follows: We begin with a review of the 
recent literature on constitutional review and judicial lawmaking.  We then 
describe the evolution of some of the ancillary powers of constitutional 
courts around the world, both as provided by constitutional texts and as exer-
cised in practice.  We conclude by speculating on the tension that emerges 
between lawmaking and dispute resolution in the exercise of these ancillary 
powers. 
II. Constitutional Review and Judicial Lawmaking 
A. The Spread of Constitutional Review 
Constitutional interpretation is arguably an essential function of written 
constitutions, but for much of the history of written constitutions the task was 
primarily assigned (if at all) to the legislature in accordance with the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty.5  The American experience with Marbury v. 
Madison6 was, however, emulated in several Latin American constitutions in 
 
focuses largely on the Supreme Court’s constitutional law opinions and votes, a topic too broad and 
sporadic to have any meaningful impact on everyday American politics). 
4. See Tom Ginsburg, The Global Spread of Constitutional Review, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 2, at 81, 83–84 (discussing possible causes for the 
emergence of judicial review under the U.S. Constitution). 
5. See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 1–4 (2003) (illustrating how 
judicial review has largely replaced notions of parliamentary sovereignty as the primary vehicle of 
constitutional interpretation in modern Europe). 
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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the nineteenth century7 and in other countries, such as Norway, where courts 
announced the power to review legislation for constitutionality.8  Figure 1 
documents the spread of the norm of designating a particular body with au-
thority to interpret the constitution, suggesting that the norm was well 
established by the turn of the twentieth century.9 
 
Figure 1: Proportion of Constitutions in Force That Provide Explicitly for 
Constitutional Interpretation 
Universe: All Independent States Since 1789 (N = 562 Constitutions) 
 
In the mid-twentieth century, the rise of designated constitutional courts 
associated with Hans Kelsen’s Austrian model shifted the institutional locus 
of constitutional review.10  Within the universe of constitutions providing for 
explicit interpretation, there has been a distinct trend away from legislative 
 
7. See M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW 107–08, 111 (2004) (detailing the transformative 
impact the introduction of judicial review had on Mexican and Argentine governmental structures in 
the nineteenth century). 
8. Rune Slagstad, The Breakthrough of Judicial Review in the Norwegian System, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE UNDER OLD CONSTITUTIONS 81, 81 (Eivind Smith ed., 1995). 
9. All data in this Article is drawn from the authors’ Comparative Constitutions Project, which 
collects information about the formal characteristics of contemporary and historical written 
constitutions.  For a description of the project and its methodology, see Tom Ginsburg & Zachary 
Elkins, Comparative Constitutions Project, http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ 
(specific data is on file with the authors). 
10. Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 85 (explaining that the constitutional-court model used in Europe 
post-World War II emanated from Kelsen’s Austrian initiative, which subjugated legislative acts to 
judicial review). 
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interpretation and toward interpretation by courts, particularly toward a 
designated constitutional court.  For example, virtually every Eastern 
European country that drafted constitutions after the fall of communism in 
1989 adopted a specialized constitutional court.11  Other constitution makers 
in new democracies have also preferred the Kelsenian model.  Figure 2 
provides a graphic illustration of some of these striking trends.  The data 
suggest a secular increase in the interpretive role of constitutional courts at 
the expense of ordinary courts and, in particular, legislatures. 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of Constitutions That Provide Primary Review 
Power to Select Bodies 
Universe: Constitutions with Explicit Constitutional Review (N = 404) 
 
 
B. The Political Logics of Constitutional Review 
Constitutional review can be divided into two different kinds of tasks 
with very different political logics: the resolution of disputes among multiple 
lawmakers and the protection of individual rights.12  Both of these involve 
 
11. Id.  The exception being Estonia, where the Supreme Court functions as both an ordinary 
high court and a court of constitutional review.  EESTI VABARIIGI PÕHISEADUS [PÕHISEADUS] 
[Constitution] art. 149 (Est.), translated in 6 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 
(Rüdiger Wolfrum & Rainer Grote eds., 2009). 
12. See Miguel Schor, An Essay on the Emergence of Constitutional Courts: The Cases of 
Mexico and Colombia, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 4, on 
file at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134183) (distinguishing the 
constitutional powers of the Mexican Supreme Court, which “police[s] vertical and horizontal 
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the constraint of present-day political authorities on the basis of fundamental 
principles in the constitutional text.  First, consider the logic of dispute reso-
lution among multiple lawmakers.  Here we can include the classic federalist 
rationale for judicial review so apparent in the early history of the U.S. 
Supreme Court and in Hans Kelsen’s model for the Austrian Constitutional 
Court.  With two levels of lawmaking authority, each with its own area of 
competence, a neutral third party is needed to ensure that neither lawmaker 
steps over the boundary into the other’s jurisdictional domain.  The oft-noted 
affinity between federalism and judicial review reflects this need.13 
We can also include horizontal separation-of-powers schemes as 
drawing on the logic of dispute resolution.  Where two parallel bodies have 
different zones of lawmaking authority, a neutral third is needed to police the 
boundary.  The scheme of divided lawmaking between the executive and 
legislature in the Constitution of Fifth Republic France is the quintessential 
example here.  The French system allows the executive to make law by 
decree,14 and established a Conseil Constitutionnel in large part to keep 
parliamentary legislation from impinging on the executive’s zone of 
 
separation of powers,” from those of the Colombian Constitutional Court, which acts to “deepen the 
social bases of democracy by constructing rights”). 
13. See LUIS LOPEZ GUERRA, EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW, CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION IN FEDERAL AND REGIONAL SYSTEMS 3 (2002), http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/ 
CDL-JU(2002)024-e.pdf (“The truth is that with only a few exceptions, in Europe the task of 
judicially resolving conflicts between central and regional or federal authorities is usually assigned 
to Constitutional Courts or equivalent judicial bodies.”).  The distinct nature of conflict resolution is 
evident in constitutions that have special procedures for resolving conflicts of competence.  See, 
e.g., BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [Constitution] BGBl No.1/1930, as last amended by 
Bundesgesetz [BG] BGBl I No. 100/2003, art. 138, § 1(c), (Austria), translated in 1 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 11 (granting the Constitutional 
Court the power to pronounce on conflicts of competence between a state and the Federation); 
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Constitution] art. 93, §§ 1, 3–4 
(F.R.G.), translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 11 
(granting the Federal Constitutional Court authority to rule on “disputes” or “disagreements” 
between the Federation and the Länder); CONSTITUCIÓN [C.E.] art. 161, §§ 1(c), 2 (Spain), 
translated in 17 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 11 (granting the 
Constitutional Court the power to resolve jurisdictional and statutory disputes between “the State 
and the Autonomous Communities”).  Occasionally, provisions for multiple lawmakers are utilized 
in a constitutional text with regard to specific territories as a means of ensuring their acquiescence 
to central authority.  In Finland, for example, the Supreme Court can determine conflicts between 
the central state and the Åland Islands.  See SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [PERUSTUSLAKI] 
[Constitution] § 120 (Fin.), translated in 17 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, 
supra note 11 (granting the Åland Islands self-governance as a matter of constitutional right and 
incorporating the Act on the Autonomy of Åland (1991), which gives the Supreme Court authority 
to decide conflicts of authority under § 60).  The Bosnia–Herzegovina constitutional text (which 
was part of the 1995 Dayton Agreement) similarly gives the Court competence to resolve disputes 
between the two geographic entities.  CONST. BOSN. & HERZ. art. VI, § 3(a). 
14. See John D. Huber, Executive Decree Authority in France, in EXECUTIVE DECREE 
AUTHORITY 233, 233 (John M. Carey & Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 1998) (remarking that “the 
French Constitution of 1958 creates two executives, a president and a prime minister” and that 
“[f]or both of these executives, decree authority is an important ingredient”). 
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authority.15  In the United States, one can think of constitutional disputes 
over executive competence, such as the proper scope of the Commander-in-
Chief power or issues related to judicial control of administration in situa-
tions of congressional delegation to agencies.  Each of these problems 
involves defining the boundary between multiple lawmakers and enforcing 
the founding bargain that set up the institutions in the first place. 
The second major function of judicial review is individual-rights 
protection.  The image here is of the judge as hero and policy maker.  Rather 
than triadic dispute resolution among governmental bodies, the judge defends 
the individual from the mighty apparatus of the state in the interest of par-
ticular substantive goals of liberal democracy.  The policy-making role of 
courts is more apparent here because the logic of seemingly neutral dispute 
resolution does not really mask it.  When the court substitutes its own judg-
ment for that of the government or legislature, it cannot be doing anything 
other than policy making. 
Much work has shown how courts created to play the basic dispute-
resolving function can transform their role into one that involves much more 
explicit policy making.  Again, French experience provides a paradigmatic 
example.  Some years after its creation as a body to police the boundary 
between the executive and legislature, the Conseil “discover[ed]” that the 
1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man formed a part of the French 
Constitution.16  This gave the Court a human-rights mandate that it had not 
previously exercised.17  With constitutional amendments in summer 2008 
granting the Conseil powers of prospective review for the first time, the 
transformation is complete.  The similar transformation of the U.S. Supreme 
Court from its early focus on centralizing federalism into, in part, a rights 
guardian began before Lochner v. New York18 and has expanded with fits and 
starts since then.19  Again, a court shifted from dispute resolver to rights 
protector over time. 
 
15. ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE 47 (1992) (“The function of the 
Council was made explicit: to facilitate the centralization of executive authority, and to ensure that 
the system would not somehow revert to traditional parliamentary orthodoxy.”). 
16. See id. at 37, 41–45 (describing how the Preamble to the French Fourth Republic 
Constitution gradually became accepted as an authoritative constitutional document despite the 
creators’ apparent contrary intentions). 
17. See id. at 45 (“Courts . . . began to catalog, and quite explicitly, a vast array of 
constitutional and extra-constitutional principles[,] . . . includ[ing] such discoverable notions as 
‘individual liberty,’ ‘equality before the law,’ ‘freedom of conscience,’ and 
‘nonretroactivity’ . . . .”). 
18. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
19. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (holding that a Colorado state 
constitutional amendment seeking to preclude legal protection of gay rights was unconstitutional); 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (holding that a state denies defendants equal 
protection when members of the community who share a common ethnicity with the defendant are 
purposely excluded from being on the jury); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) 
(granting indigent criminal defendants the right to legal counsel); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483, 495–96 (1954) (prohibiting racial segregation of public schools). 
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Regardless of whether the court is functioning as a boundary-guarding 
dispute resolver or as a rights-enforcing constraint on government, a common 
thread in both forms of constitutional review is judicial lawmaking.  This 
feature of lawmaking is inherent in the judicial and administrative process.20  
In lieu of the Montesquieuan conception of rule making as practiced solely 
by the legislature,21 we must accept judicial lawmaking if we are to 
characterize adjudication as applying general principles to particular cases.  
This is so even if judges are adept at characterizing their role as merely 
applying preexisting rules; that sort of justification is simply part of the 
game.22 
The lawmaking function of constitutional review has been highlighted 
in two literatures bridging political science and law.  The first is comparative 
work, by Alec Stone Sweet and others, that focused initially on the Conseil 
Constitutionnel.23  The French system of prepromulgation abstract review 
highlights the lawmaking function because the Conseil’s declarations of un-
constitutionality almost always lead to revision and resubmission of the 
legislation to conform with the constitutional dictates of the Conseil.24  Stone 
Sweet observed that this type of review turns the Conseil into a specialized 
third chamber of the legislature.25  Stone Sweet used this insight to develop a 
broader “legislative” approach to abstract review,26 in which judicial 
lawmaking is not the particular and retrospective type identified by Shapiro27 
but rather shares with the legislative process the elaboration of general norms 
for prospective application. 
 
20. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS 28 (1981) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, COURTS] (“Nearly all 
contemporary students of courts agree that courts do engage in at least supplementary and 
interstitial lawmaking, filling in the details of statutory or customary law.  In several major systems 
courts go far beyond interstitial lawmaking.”) (endnote omitted); MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 21–22, 93–95 (1968) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, SUPREME 
COURT] (noting that both courts and agencies play major policy-making roles on constitutional 
issues in the United States). 
21. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6 
(Anne M. Cohler et al. trans. and eds., Cambridge University Press, 1989) (1750). 
22. See Martin Shapiro, Judges As Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 155–56 (1994) 
(“[Courts] must always deny their authority to make law, even when they are making law.”). 
23. E.g., STONE, supra note 15; Alec Stone, The Birth and Development of Abstract Review: 
Constitutional Courts and Policymaking in Western Europe, 19 POL’Y STUD. J. 81 (1990) 
[hereinafter Stone, The Birth and Development of Abstract Review]; Alec Stone, Complex 
Coordinate Construction in France and Germany, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL 
POWER, supra note 1, at 205 [hereinafter Stone, Complex Coordinate Construction]. 
24. See Stone, The Birth and Development of Abstract Review, supra note 23, at 84 (explaining 
that in the French system of a priori review, laws are referred to the court by politicians after 
adoption but before promulgation, effectively extending what would otherwise be a concluded 
legislative process). 
25. STONE, supra note 15, at 8–9. 
26. Id. 
27. See SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT, supra note 20, at 9–11 (describing how the Supreme Court 
functions as a dispute-resolution body that settles disagreements over the validity and interpretation 
of statutes and regulations). 
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The lawmaking function of constitutional courts is emphasized in a 
second literature that has become a central paradigm in public-law studies of 
law and courts—namely, strategic accounts of judicial power.  The core 
insight of the strategic model is that courts can make law but are constrained 
by other actors in the political system.28  This work originated in the context 
of “dynamic” statutory interpretation in the United States.29  The Supreme 
Court can adopt its preferred interpretation of a particular piece of 
legislation.  Whether this judicial interpretation is stable depends, in spatial 
terms, on the distance between the interpretation and the ideal policy prefer-
ences of other actors.30  If both houses of Congress and the President disagree 
with the Court and can agree on a more preferred interpretation, they can 
cooperate to pass new legislation overturning the Court.  The process then 
starts all over again.  Over time, the Court and Congress continue to develop 
the law together; the law is simply the equilibrium outcome of their games of 
power.  Much empirical work has documented the back and forth of 
Congress and the Court engaging in “constitutional dialogues” in particular 
policy areas.31 
This work has positive and normative implications.  The positive 
implication is that judicial “activism” is a continuous variable reflecting the 
zone of space where other actors cannot sufficiently agree to overturn judi-
cially enacted policy.  This means that the ability of courts to deviate from 
the desired preferences of politicians will vary as those preferences them-
selves diverge from each other.  For example, judicial lawmaking power 
should expand in periods of divided government because politicians will find 
it more difficult to agree. 
The constitutional structure will also play a key role in determining the 
extent of judicial power: in the proverbial state of other things being equal, 
more actors involved in the legislative process should lead to more policy 
space in which the court can work because of the difficulty of passing new 
legislation.  It is thus not surprising that courts in the United Kingdom, facing 
 
28. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 69 (1994) 
(claiming that legislative and executive forces act as political constraints on the Supreme Court’s 
decision-making function). 
29.  See, e.g., id. (demonstrating that an interpreter’s statutory interpretations are “constrained 
both by the way the issue is framed for her from below and by the prospect that her interpretation 
will be overridden from above”); John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of 
Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 263, 263 (1992) (“If a court’s decision fails to 
reflect external political reality, it cannot stand for long.”). 
30. See Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 29, at 267–69 (building a one-dimensional model of 
the Court’s authority to enact its policy preferences vis-à-vis previously enacted legislation). 
31. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 138–57 (1998) 
(delineating the ways in which the Court is constrained by separation of powers and using the 
parties’ briefs in a random sampling of cases to show that the Court is often informed of the 
preferences of other political actors); see also LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: 
INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 233–47 (1988) (outlining the means by which 
constitutional interpretation is a shared enterprise calling on the best efforts of both Congress and 
the Judiciary). 
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only one majoritarian legislative body in the House of Commons, are less 
active than are courts in the United States, which contend with weaker parties 
and three separate institutions that must collaborate to make new law.32  Nor 
is it surprising that the European Court of Justice has a great deal of strategic 
space in which to operate, with many diverse states involved in the formal 
lawmaking process.33 
The key distinction between statutory and constitutional interpretation 
in this view hinges on the greater difficulty of overruling the court in the 
constitutional context.  Constitutional amendments are more difficult to 
obtain than are ordinary legislative acts.  A judicial decision to treat a policy 
area as a constitutional matter will render the court much more powerful, not 
only because of the normative significance attached to the constitution but 
also because overruling a constitutional interpretation requires a const-
itutional amendment. 
This work on judicial lawmaking also has a normative implication.  A 
judicial interpretation that deviates from the statutory or constitutional text 
may in fact be legitimate if it is within the tolerance zones of other sitting 
political actors.  William Eskridge has argued forcefully for just this kind of 
“dynamic” approach to statutory interpretation.34  The court’s creativity plays 
a role in keeping the system up to date and saves the legislature the trouble of 
having to continually amend legislation.35  The positive observation of 
judicial lawmaking now has normative significance. 
One of us has argued that the basic political rationale behind the 
adoption of constitutional review is one of political insurance.36  When 
parties are uncertain about their position in the future constitutional order, 
they have a need for a neutral body to provide a forum to challenge majority 
rule, to fill gaps in the text, and to articulate the bargain in accordance with 
 
32. See Robert D. Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical 
Test of Economic Models, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 295, 296 (1996) (arguing that the American 
system fosters more “judicial creativity” than the British system because the presence of a bicameral 
Congress and a President provides three independent vetoes on new legislation, thereby “allow[ing] 
the court[s] to diverge further before provoking a legislative correction”). 
33. See id. at 308–09 (postulating that the development of the European Union, with an 
increasingly powerful European Parliament, has increased legislative resistance and in turn 
expanded the judicial discretion of the European Court of Justice). 
34. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 28, at 131, 130–32 (“[T]he traditional rule has been that patterns 
of statutory interpretations by agencies and courts adapting a statute to changed circumstances are 
presumptively valid so long as they have been brought to Congress’s attention and Congress has not 
changed them.”). 
35. See id. at 132 (arguing that one reason to separate the legislative and judicial powers is to 
leave the legislative agenda uncluttered by issues of statutory fine-tuning). 
36. See GINSBURG, supra note 5, at 18 (viewing judicial review as a form of political insurance 
for elected constitutional drafters that guarantees them a forum to challenge the legislature if they 
lose their postconstitutional elections). 
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the wishes of the founders.37  This insures electoral losers from being 
dominated by the winners. 
All this work on constitutional review and constitutional courts has 
developed the basic insight that courts make law into a sophisticated 
framework for understanding judicial power in particular political contexts.  
But the very success of the research program has obscured other questions.  
Judicial power becomes equivalent to the extent of lawmaking discretion in 
any particular context.  As we shall see, however, a complete survey of 
powers allocated to constitutional courts goes beyond lawmaking. 
III. Ancillary Powers 
A. Types and Trends 
Besides the core task of constitutional review of legislation and 
administrative action, constitutional courts have been granted other powers, 
including such duties as proposing legislation;38 determining whether politi-
cal parties are unconstitutional;39 certifying states of emergency;40 
impeaching senior governmental officials;41 and adjudicating election 
 
37. See id. at 19 (“Political uncertainty leads to the adoption of judicial review as a form of 
insurance to protect the constitutional bargain.”). 
38. See, e.g., KONSTITUCIIA CHECHENSKOJ RESPUBLIKI [KONST. CHECH. ICH.] [Constitution], 
1992, art. 65 (Chechen Republic of Ichkeria), translated in 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF DEPENDENCIES 
AND TERRITORIES (Philip Raworth ed., 2005) (including the courts with Parliament and the 
President in the group that has the right of legislative initiative); Federal’nyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon 
[FKZ] [Federal Constitutional Law], O Konstitutsionnyi Sud Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. Sud RF] 
[On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation], Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 1994, No. 13, Item 1447, art. 3, 
§ 6, translated in 15 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 11 (“[The 
Constitutional Court] shall take legislative initiative on matters within its jurisdiction.”). 
39. See, e.g., KONSTITUTSIYA NA BALGARIYA [KONST. BULG.] [Constitution] art. 149, § 1(5), 
translated in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 11 (declaring that 
the Constitutional Court will rule on disputes concerning the constitutionality of political parties); 
GG art. 21, § 2 (F.R.G.) (declaring parties that seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic 
order unconstitutional); ZHONGHUA MINGUA XIANFA ZENG XIU DIAO WEN [XIANFA ZENG XIU 
DIAO WEN] [Additional Articles to the Constitution] art. 5 (Taiwan), translated in 18 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 11 (“[The] Constitutional Court 
[shall] adjudicate matters relating to . . . the dissolution of unconstitutional political parties.”). 
40. See, e.g., HAYASTANI HANRAPETOWT’YAN SAHMANADROWT’YOWNY, 1995 
[SAHMANADROWT’YOWNY] [Constitution], art. 100, § 6 (amended 2005) (Arm.), available at http:// 
www.president.am/files/output.php?fid=111 (establishing the Constitutional Court’s ability to 
certify whether or not the President has grounds to invoke a state of emergency). 
41. See, e.g., KONST. BULG. art. 149, § 1(8) (directing the Court to rule on impeachment of the 
President or Vice President once it is initiated by the National Assembly); GG art. 61, § 1 (F.R.G.) 
(empowering the Federal Constitutional Court with the ability to declare that the President forfeited 
his or her office by willfully violating the Basic Law); A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA 
[ALKOTMÁNYA] [Constitution] art. 31/A, § 6 (Hung.), translated in 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 11 (allowing the Court to remove the President after an 
impeachment proceeding if it finds that he has violated the law); MONGOL ULSYN ÜNDSEN KHUULI 
[ÜNDSEN KHUULI] [Constitution] art. 35, § 2 (Mong.), translated in 12 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
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violations.42  U.S. federal courts have some of these and other powers, 
including rule making43 and, until recently, a role in appointing special 
prosecutors.44  Constitutional courts have been given a wide range of other 
powers that move even further afield from the defining role of judicial 
review.  From 1994 to 1996, the Constitutional Court of Belarus had the 
power to “submit proposals to the Supreme Council on the need for amend-
ments and addenda to the Constitution and on the adoption and amendment 
of laws.”45  The Azerbaijani draft constitution gave the constitutional court 
power to “dissolve parliament if it repeatedly passes laws that violate the 
Constitution,”46 though this, perhaps thankfully, did not survive into the final 
draft.47  The South African Constitutional Court must certify the constitutions 
of provinces for conformity with the Constitution.48  Portugal’s 
Constitutional Court must certify the death or incapacity of the President.49 
The Constitutional Court of Thailand, first set up in 1997 as part of an 
effort to clamp down on corruption,50 exercised a wide array of ancillary 
powers, and it continues to do so under the 2007 Constitution.  It can 
 
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 11 (allowing for removal of the President on the basis of 
findings from the Constitutional Court of an abuse of power). 
42. See, e.g., GG art. 41, § 2 (F.R.G.) (allowing for complaints concerning electoral legitimacy 
and oversight to be lodged with the Federal Constitutional Court); LA CONSTITUTION [1958 
CONST.] arts. 58–60 (Fr.), translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, 
supra note 11 (granting the Constitutional Council the power to examine electoral disputes); 
LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [LITH. KONST.] [Constitution] art. 105, § 3(1) (Lith.), 
translated in 11 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 11 (requiring the 
Constitutional Court to present conclusions about violations of election laws in presidential or 
parliamentary elections). 
43. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000) (“The Supreme Court shall have the 
power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence . . . .”); James E. 
Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1518 (2001) (observing that the Supreme Court’s power “to exercise wide 
ranging, freestanding supervisory powers over inferior courts and ministerial officers” is rooted in 
Anglo-American jurisprudential precedent). 
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(1) (2000) (“Upon receipt of an application . . . the division of the 
court shall appoint an appropriate independent counsel and shall define that independent counsel’s 
prosecutorial jurisdiction.”). 
45. KANSTYTUCYJA RÈSPUBLIKI BELARUS′ [KANST. BELR.] [Constitution], art. 130 (repealed 
1996). 
46. Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitution Making in the Countries of Former Soviet Dominance: 
Current Development, 23 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 155, 190 (1993). 
47. AZƏRBAYCAN KONSTITUSIYA [AZER. KONST.] [Constitution] art. 130, § 3 (Azer.), 
translated in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 11 (enumerating the 
current powers of the Constitutional Court of Azerbaijan, which do not include the ability to 
dissolve Parliament). 
48. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 144. 
49. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONST. PORT.] art. 223, § 2(a), translated in 
15 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 11. 
50. Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Afterlife: The Continuing Impact of Thailand’s Post-political 
Constitution, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 83, 94 (2009). 
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introduce organic laws;51 determine whether an Emergency Decree is made 
in a real emergency;52 determine whether members of the House of 
Representatives and Election Commissioners should be disqualified;53 and 
decide whether political-party regulations violate the Constitution or funda-
mental principles of Thai governance.54  Its President is a member of the 
selection committees for the appointed seats in the Senate and for most inde-
pendent agencies charged with monitoring government.55  In 1997, the 
Constitutional Court also had the duty to confirm findings of and evaluate 
disclosures submitted to the new National Counter-Corruption Commission 
(NCCC).56 
How common are these ancillary powers?  Figure 3 provides an 
indicator of the trends.  In the Comparative Constitutions Project survey, 
which covers the 800 or so constitutions since 1789, we ask whether consti-
tutional courts are given any powers besides the power of judicial review.  
Following the appearance of the Kelsenian model in 1920, we begin to see 
constitutional courts’ formal powers accumulate.  Figure 3 provides the mean 
number of ancillary powers provided to constitutional courts in formal con-
stitutional texts, over time.  The typical constitutional court in existence 
today has three ancillary powers—a three-fold increase from the Kelsen era 
when these bodies took on an average of one other function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51. RÁTTÀTAMMÁNOON HÀENG RA ̂ATCHÁANAAJÀK TAI [RÁTTÀTAMMÁNOON] [Constitution] 
art. 139 (Thail.), translated in 18 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 
11. 
52. See id. § 185 (stipulating that the Constitutional Court presides over complaints by 
legislators that a potential Emergency Decree is unconstitutional and determines whether the 
complaints are valid). 
53. Id. §§ 91, 233. 
54. Id. §§ 65, 68. 
55. Id. §§ 113, 231, 243, 246. 
56. RÁTTÀTAMMÁNOON, 1997, § 295 (Thail.) (repealed 2007).  For further discussion of this 
role of the Constitutional Court of Thailand, see infra notes 101–14 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 3: The Average Number of Ancillary Functions Assigned to 
Constitutional Courts, by Year 
Universe: Constitutions with Constitutional Courts (N = 121) 
 
Table 1 shows the principal ancillary functions provided to 
constitutional courts and the proportion of contemporary constitutions (as of 
2006) that provide each power. 
 
Table 1: Some Frequent Ancillary Powers of Constitutional Courts 
Universe: Constitutions with Constitutional Courts in Force in 2006 
(N = 77) 
Function Percent with Function 
Adjudicate or Supervise Elections 55 
Review Treaties 39 
Adjudicate Charges Against the Executive 30 
Adjudicate Charges of Illegal Political Parties 29 
Review States of Emergency 7 
 
One can array these ancillary powers on a spectrum, from those that 
rather clearly involve judicial lawmaking (such as proposing legislation and 
articulating the standards that make a political party unconstitutional), to 
those that involve relatively pure forms of dispute resolution (such as im-
peachment and electoral disputes) in which decisions may be highly political, 
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but lawmaking is at a minimum.  The function of judicial review itself lies 
strongly toward the lawmaking end of the spectrum; at the other end of the 
spectrum are cases in which the court is resolving ad hoc disputes without 
even referring to the constitutional text.  We will take the powers in this 
order. 
B. Proposing Legislation 
The first power grows rather directly out of the lawmaking functions of 
review described above.  Courts engaged in constitutional dialogues are 
sometimes characterized as acting as a kind of negative legislator, constrain-
ing the legislature and bounding its actions rather than positively making 
rules.57  This formulation goes back directly to Kelsen, who explicitly de-
signed the Austrian Constitutional Court with this conception in mind.58  It 
finds echoes in Stone Sweet’s characterization of the French Conseil, which 
exercised review of legislation before promulgation as a third legislative 
chamber.59 
The distinction between negative and positive legislation is really rather 
formal, and it turns only on who has the power of initial proposal.  For once a 
proposal is made, a decision restricting that proposal has as much substantive 
impact as the initial proposal.  Indeed, this very aspect of negative legislation 
is highlighted in scholarly accounts of separation-of-powers games, where 
the key term is whether or not an institution provides a “veto gate” on new 
legislation.60  The power of the veto gate is really a negative lawmaking 
power. 
This is not to say, however, that the stage of the legislative process at 
which courts pass judgment is inconsequential.  Indeed, constitutional review 
 
57. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: 
Paradoxes and Contrasts, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 197, 200 (Georg Nolte ed., 
2005) (“The constitutional judge as negative legislator may invalidate laws only to the extent that 
they contravene formal constitutional requirements . . . and, therefore, may remain largely 
apolitical.”). 
58. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW & STATE 268 (Transaction Publishers 2006) 
(1949) (“The annulment of a law is a legislative function, an act—so to speak—of negative 
legislation.  A court which is competent to abolish laws—individually or generally—functions as a 
negative legislator.”); Clemens Jabloner, Introduction to Reprinted Works of Hans Kelsen, in 
WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS 67, 71 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink eds., 
Belinda Cooper et al. trans., 2002) (remarking that during Kelsen’s service on the Austrian 
Constitutional Court, “establishing the court’s theoretical and constitutional basis remained at the 
center of Kelsen’s commitment”). 
59. See STONE, supra note 15, at 108 (stressing that “every Council decision objectively 
constitutes the final stage of one legislative process,” and therefore “the Council can be fruitfully 
conceptualized as a kind of third legislative chamber”). 
60. See, e.g., GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK 19 
(2002) (elaborating a concept whereby the “constitution of a country can assign the status of veto 
player to different individual or collective actors,” who are then institutional veto players in that 
constitutional system); Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Process, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 403, 408 (Barry Clarke & Joe Foweraker eds., 2001) (describing the veto 
gate as a “negative agenda control”). 
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is arguably at its most potent when it can be exercised prior to the 
promulgation of legislation, rather than after, when inertial forces can render 
judicial action more difficult.  As Figure 4 shows, since the Kelsenian 
innovation, constitutional courts have tended increasingly to wield pre- as 
opposed to post-promulgation power.  While only a minority of constitu-
tional courts held pre-promulgation review power prior to World War II, a 
majority (81% in 2006) now do.  Thus, the negative power of these courts 
tends to be especially strong, as negative powers go. 
 
Figure 4: Proportion of Constitutional Courts That Have Explicit Pre-
Promulgation Judicial Review 
Universe: Constitutions with Constitutional Courts (N = 121) 
 
Even then, the slight distinction between negative and positive 
legislation breaks down completely when the court has the power to hold 
legislative omissions unconstitutional.  In this type of review, well-developed 
in Germany and copied by constitutional courts in countries as diverse as 
Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, and Taiwan, the court can set a 
deadline by which the legislature must act to correct an omission.61  The 
 
61. See ÚSTAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [ÚSTAVA] [Constitution] art. 127, § 2 (Slovk.), 
translated in 18 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 11 (“If the 
violation of rights or freedoms . . . has arisen due to the inactivity of the other party, the 
Constitutional Court may order it to act on the issue.”); The Constitutional Court Act art. 68, § 1 
(1988) (Kor.), translated in 10 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 11 
(“Any person who claims that one or more of his or her basic rights . . . have been violated by an 
exercise or non-exercise of governmental power may file a constitutional complaint with the 
Constitutional Court . . . .”); DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 53 (2nd ed., rev. & expanded 1997) (indicating the effectiveness 
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court can even suggest specific language that would pass constitutional 
muster.62  Statutes then passed in response to court proposals become the 
bases for additional rounds of review.63 
It is not much of a jump from this type of review to one that explicitly 
allows the constitutional court to propose legislation, either within a desig-
nated area of competence or more generally.  Yet it is quite rare that 
constitutional courts are explicitly given the power to propose legislation; the 
Russian Constitutional Court is a prominent example of one with such 
power.64  Some state courts in the United States have the power to promul-
gate rules of evidence,65 but proposing norms outside the narrow confines of 
the judicial function is nearly unheard of.  In part, this may result from ardent 
fidelity to the separation-of-powers formalism that sees courts as passive 
interpreters rather than lawmakers.  Where courts have explicit norm-
proposing power, they can no longer draw on the imagery, contested by 
Shapiro, of being neutral appliers of preexisting norms.66  Their very 
“courtness” would be called into question were they allowed to propose 
general law directly, rather than indirectly as they already do.  As a norma-
tive matter, it is interesting to speculate whether expanding explicit 
lawmaking power would really be so deleterious, but that consideration is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
C. Supervising Political Parties 
It is not infrequent that constitutional courts are given the task of 
supervising political parties alleged to have unconstitutional programs in 
 
in Germany of using “admonitory decisions” to declare legislative omissions inconsistent with the 
constitution); GINSBURG, supra note 5, at 143–44 (describing the imposition of deadlines for 
compliance on the legislature by the Judicial Yuan of Taiwan); HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 79–80 (2000) (asserting 
that “omissions jurisdiction” imparts upon the Hungarian Constitutional Court essentially the ability 
to mandate specific legislation); CONST. COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVN., PROBLEMS OF 
LEGISLATIVE OMISSION IN CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 3 (2007), http://www.lrkt.lt/ 
conference/Pranesimai/Euroconference%20Vilnius-anglesko%20besedilo.doc (“[C]ertain omissions 
of the legislature can entail unconstitutional gaps in the law.”). 
62. See, e.g., CONST. COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVN., supra note 61, at 5 (indicating that 
Article 40 of the Slovenia Constitutional Court Act empowers the Court to operate as a “positive 
legislator,” suggesting and imposing laws of its own creation). 
63. The use of deadlines in this type of review is slightly at odds with the rule-of-law imagery 
underlying constitutional court power.  The court finds that legislation violates the constitution, but 
lets it stand for a designated period.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 61, at 80.  Those affected by the 
legislation will be treated as constitutionally bound one day, and not bound a day later after the 
deadline.  Clearly this type of system is a pragmatic recognition of the dialogue phenomenon. 
64. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [Constitution] art. 104 (Russ.), 
translated in 15 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 11; see also 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 61, at 256 n.32. 
65. DAVID M. HEDGE, GOVERNANCE AND THE CHANGING AMERICAN STATES 160 (1998). 
66. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT, supra note 20, at 18. 
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polities that take an aggressive stance toward safeguarding democracy.67  The 
fountainhead of this kind of supervision is that required by Article 21, 
Section 2 of the German Basic Law, banning parties that oppose the “free 
democratic basic order.”68  This gave rise to two famous cases familiar to 
comparativists wherein the German Constitutional Court banned unconstitu-
tional parties.69  We should also emphasize that the banning of certain parties 
is not at all uncommon in post-World War II constitutions.  Prior to World 
War II, our data show that only three constitutions had ever included provi-
sions proscribing political parties (the constitutions of Colombia 1886, Cuba 
1940, and Guatemala 1945).70  By 1955, however, 16% of constitutions in 
force banned certain parties or certain types of parties.71  This proportion has 
grown over the years and has even increased since the Cold War.72  Among 
contemporary constitutions, 28% contain party proscription provisions.73 
The power of constitutional courts to regulate political parties has been 
widely copied in the postsocialist context and given rise to dramatic deci-
sions in this area, including the famous decision of the first Russian Court to 
ban the Communist Party74 and a prominent decision in Bulgaria to ban a 
Macedonian-nationalist party.75  The actual scope of the court’s power varies 
from evaluating party programs to actual behavior.  For example, in 
Macedonia, the Court’s action is limited to evaluating the statute and 
programs of political parties to ensure that they are not directed against the 
constitutional order, designed to encourage ethnic hatred, or inviting military 
 
67. See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 
52 (1995) (discussing, among other examples, the Turkish Constitutional Court’s prohibition of 
moderate Kurdish-oriented parties, which the Court believed were “destroying the . . . indivisible 
integrity of the territory and the people and the existence of the Turkish state”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
68. GG art. 21, § 2; see also KOMMERS, supra note 61, at 13 (labeling art. 21, § 2 as the “most 
vivid expression” of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s role as guardian of the 
constitutional order). 
69. KOMMERS, supra note 61, at 217–24.  These were the Communist Party Case, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Aug. 17, 1956, 5 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 85, and the Socialist Reich Party Case, 
BVerfG Oct. 23, 1952, 2 BverfGE 1, translated in part in KOMMERS, supra note 61, at 218–22. 
70. Specifically, Article 47 of the 1886 Colombian Constitution, Article 102 of the 1940 Cuban 
Constitution, and Article 32 of the 1945 Guatemalan Constitution.  Ginsburg & Elkins, supra 
note 9. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. See ROBERT B. AHDIEH, RUSSIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: LEGAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 1985–1996, at 80–83 (1997) (describing 
the Russian Constitutional Court’s decision to uphold Yeltsin’s decrees banning the Communist 
Party’s national body). 
75. See KRASSIMIR KANEV & METO JOVANOVSKI, INT’L HELSINKI FEDERATION FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, MACEDONIANS OF BULGARIA IN UNCERTAINTY 1 (2000), http://www.ihf-hr.org/ 
viewbinary/viewdocument.php?doc_id=5080 (“On February 28, 2000 the Constitutional Court of 
Bulgaria declared unconstitutional OMO Ilinden-PIRIN, the political party of the Macedonians of 
Bulgaria . . . .”). 
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aggression.76  The German Basic Law regulates both programs and activities 
of political parties.77 
This power has also been copied in East Asia.  During the democratic 
transition in Taiwan, the power of declaring political parties unconstitutional 
was transferred to the Council of Grand Justices (the de facto constitutional 
court of the Republic of China), away from the executive branch that had 
used the power to threaten advocates of Taiwanese independence during the 
period of one-party rule.78  Interestingly, although the Council exercises 
abstract constitutional review power generally, it is only called a consti-
tutional court when it sits to evaluate the programs of political parties.79 
Giving this power to constitutional courts highlights the small-c consti-
tutional nature of electoral and political-party laws.  Though they are not 
elaborated in detail in most formal constitutions, in a very real sense these 
rules constitute the polity.  Because of this quasi-constitutional nature, it is 
logical that the supreme guardian of constitutionality would also have a 
supervisory role over those laws.  The constitutional court can also draw on 
the image of neutrality to make what is in fact a major policy decision 
defining the outer limits of political discourse.  Constitutional courts eval-
uating political parties are really metapolicy makers; they determine the 
policy about who can make policy. 
Indeed, this ancillary power deviates only very slightly from the 
ordinary functions of judicial review of legislation and administrative action, 
and simply moves the evaluation forward in the political process.  Abstract 
pre-promulgation review examines proposed laws for their potential impact; 
policing the programs of political parties can be seen as another form of ab-
stract review that prevents some policies from even being proposed in the 
first place.  This function draws on the recognition that political parties are 
indeed important elements of a democratic political system and can be agents 
of violating constitutional rights just as government can. 
 
76. See USTAV NA REPUBLIKA MAKEDONIJA [USTAV MACED.] [Constitution] art. 110 
(Maced.), translated in 11 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 11 
(establishing human rights, civil liberties, peace, and coexistence as values underlying the 
Macedonian Constitution and nation, and granting to the Constitutional Court the authority to 
decide whether the “programmes and statutes” of political parties are conforming to the 
Constitution). 
77. See GG art. 21 (requiring that political parties’ internal organization conform to democratic 
principles and banning as unconstitutional parties that by their aims or even the behavior of their 
supporters seek to overthrow German democracy). 
78. See XIANFA ZENG XIU DIAO WEN art. 5 (“The Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan 
shall . . . form a Constitutional Court to adjudicate matters relating to . . . the dissolution of 
unconstitutional political parties.”). 
79. See id. (explaining that in addition to interpreting the Constitution and unifying the 
interpretation of laws and ordinances, the Judicial Yuan shall form a Constitutional Court to 
adjudicate matters regarding the impeachment of the President and Vice President and the 
dissolution of unconstitutional political parties). 
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Furthermore, as in judicial review, the court is basing its decision on a 
reading of the foundational text, though in practice it is often up to the court 
to provide substance to such concepts as the “free democratic basic order.”80  
Although this exercise in interpretation may be less textually grounded than 
the conventional exercise of constitutional review, it is still ultimately an 
exercise in interpretation. 
D. Removing Leaders 
Another important power of constitutional courts is to adjudicate 
impeachment or other removal hearings of a chief executive or other high 
official, typically as part of a process involving indictment by a legislative 
body.  Roughly a third of contemporary constitutional courts have this 
power.81  In terms of the political functions of courts, the obvious immediate 
analogue to impeachment is social control.  A political figure has committed 
a criminal act or a willful violation of the constitution (the actual formulation 
of the predicate act varies).  The court must determine whether or not a vio-
lation has occurred or if it warrants removal from office, sometimes by 
reference to the constitutional text.  In the quasi-criminal context of presi-
dential impeachment, the legislature becomes the prosecutor, and the presi-
dent the defendant.82  The constitution becomes the criminal statute to which 
the court refers. 
In fact the analogy is incomplete.  The character of impeachment in 
most constitutional schemes is better understood as a variant of the conflict-
resolution function that is at the heart of judicial review.  This is because 
impeachment hearings are unlikely to occur unless there is an institutional 
and political conflict between parliament and the executive.83  To illustrate, 
contrast the probabilities of a successful indictment of a chief executive when 
a single, disciplined political party controls the legislature and presidency as 
compared with a situation of divided government.  The president in the 
former scheme may be able to get away with crimes and misdemeanors that 
would be impeachable in the latter situation. 
Impeachment cases thus presuppose political conflict, and the court 
becomes a neutral triadic figure to adjudicate between the two antagonists.  
 
80. KOMMERS, supra note 61, at 1. 
81. See supra Table 1. 
82. See, e.g., KONST. BULG. art. 149, § 1(8) (providing that the Constitutional Court “[r]ules on 
the impeachment initiated by the National Assembly against the President”); GG art. 61, § 1 
(F.R.G.) (“The Bundestag or the Bundesrat may impeach the Federal President before the Federal 
Constitutional Court for willful violation of this Basic Law or any other federal law.”).  A related 
role is to determine disqualification of legislators.  See, e.g., KONST. BULG. art. 72, §§ 1–2 (granting 
the Constitutional Court the role of terminating the powers of national representatives upon “the 
establishment of ineligibility or incompatibility”). 
83. See Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Interaction Between Impeachment and the Independent 
Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193, 2236–37 (1998) (explaining the use of impeachment as a device 
to remedy institutional conflicts). 
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Recall that the fundamental problem of this type of dispute resolution is to 
convince the loser to comply.84  There is no higher authority over the presi-
dent and legislature that can enforce decisions; enforcement depends on the 
voluntary performance of the parties.  The legislature wants the president 
out; the president wants to stay.  The decision of the court must be self-
fulfilling in the sense that no centralized enforcement is typically needed. 
In these circumstances, the primary role of the court is not actually to 
determine facts or evaluate a standard but simply to provide an answer to 
help the parties resolve their dispute.  Its role does not depend on the image 
of courtness so much as its presence as a neutral party on the same constitu-
tional plane.  The criminal analogy is crucial for designating the consti-
tutional court as the relevant third party among all possible third parties, but 
in fact the criminal analogy is misleading in terms of the political function at 
work. 
When two parties are in a dispute and no external enforcer can impose 
sanctions on them, the parties are in one variant of a situation game theorists 
describe as a coordination problem.85  Coordination problems occur when 
two parties must decide what course of action to take based on each’s 
expectation of what action the other will take, and two potential equilibria 
exist.86  The paradigm illustration is two cars in a state of nature that must 
decide which side of the street to drive on.  If both choose the same side of 
the street (“right” or “left”), they will pass each other on the road safely, but 
if they choose alternate sides, the two will find themselves in a head-on 
collision.  The parties here need to coordinate their actions, and the key will 
be what they expect the other party to do.  Even if the two parties cannot 
communicate directly, one way to coordinate actions is for a third party to 
signal to the players to drive on the appropriate side.  Thus, if one driver ob-
serves a third party say to the other driver to drive on the left, the first driver 
may believe that the second driver is likely to follow the instruction, and the 
third party’s signal can become self-enforcing even if they have no power to 
sanction the driver. 
Many situations in dispute resolution involve similar coordination 
problems.  We will return to this kind of problem further in the next subpart, 
which concerns ad hoc election disputes.  For now, it is worth pointing out 
 
84. See David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 725 
(2009) (“[C]ourts lack any obvious means of enforcing their decisions against other government 
actors.”). 
85. See id. at 758–61 (2008) (describing “mixed-motive games” and how various circumstances 
can affect the likelihood adversarial parties will work cooperatively when their dispute is mediated 
by a judicial body). 
86. See Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive 
Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1235 (2004) 
(“Coordination games describe situations where parties have fully or partially common interests that 
can be achieved only if they coordinate their strategies among multiple possible equilibria.”). 
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that the natural instinct to give the impeachment power to the constitutional 
court ensures that it may be called on to resolve monumental political crises. 
An example of impeachment arose in South Korea in 2003.87  That year 
saw major generational change in the political arena with the rise of left-wing 
lawyer Roh Moo-hyun, who won the presidential election in late December 
2002.88  Roh’s ability to pursue his ambitious agenda, however, was compli-
cated by the fact that his Millennium Democratic Party did not win a 
majority in the National Assembly.89  His position became even less tenable 
when the party split as a result of generational tensions in September 2003 
and a corruption scandal related to campaign contributions erupted that 
October.90  Roh then staked his future on a mid-term legislative election to be 
held in April 2004, but—in violation of South Korean law—appeared to 
campaign for his new Uri Party by urging voters to support it.91  The majority 
in the National Assembly responded with a motion for impeachment, which 
easily passed by the necessary two-thirds vote.92  The impeachment was sent 
to the Constitutional Court for confirmation, as required under the 
Constitution.93 
Surprisingly, Roh’s approval rating skyrocketed in the wake of the 
impeachment, and his party received overwhelming support at the April 2004 
polls, winning an absolute majority in the National Assembly with 152 out of 
299 votes.94  Though speculative, it is generally believed that this indicator of 
the public’s preferences influenced the Court in its decision.95  On May 14, 
the Court rejected the impeachment motion, resolving the conflict and al-
lowing the political process to proceed.96  Alas, Roh’s approval ratings 
subsequently tanked, but this was hardly the fault of the Court.97 
 
87. See Youngjae Lee, Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Impeachment of Roh Moo-hyun 
from a Comparative Constitutional Perspective, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 403, 406–07 (2005) 
(comparing the U.S. and Korean impeachment processes, and elucidating the increasing 
judicialization of megapolitical systems). 
88. Id. at 408. 
89. Id. at 409. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 410–11. 
92. Id. at 411–12. 
93. Id. at 412. 
94. Id. 
95. See id. at 411 (commenting that polls indicated seven out of ten Korean citizens opposed 
the impeachment). 
96. Id. at 404. 
97. See Norimitsu Onishi, South Korea’s President Sags in Opinion Polls, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 27, 2006, at A6 (describing President Roh as being “battered mercilessly in the polls”). 
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E. Electoral Disputes 
The most common ancillary role for constitutional courts is supervising 
or adjudicating elections or election authorities.98  As Table 1 shows, a 
majority of constitutional courts now have such powers.  Referenda are 
supervised by constitutional courts in Portugal, Armenia, and many other 
countries.99  The Conseil Constitutionnel can supervise the legality of elec-
tions for the president or legislature, and referenda,100 as do many of the 
constitutional courts today.  This ancillary power differs from all the previ-
ous ones in that there is frequently not even a formal link between the dispute 
and the text of the constitution.  Rather, this jurisdiction is basically one of ad 
hoc dispute resolution on a case-by-case basis. 
Why is there a trend toward involving constitutional courts in electoral 
oversight?  The logic of coordination seems to have something to do with it.  
We want to illustrate this point by discussing recent prominent electoral deci-
sions by two very different courts with constitutional review powers, the 
Constitutional Court of Thailand and the U.S. Supreme Court.101  The 
Constitutional Court of Thailand, set up in 1997 when Thailand returned to 
civilian rule after five years of being under military control, was given the 
power of supervising the decisions of the new NCCC.102  Corruption has 
been an endemic issue in Thailand, and the 1997 Constitution was designed 
to ensure clean politics.103  The NCCC collected reports on assets from politi-
cians and senior bureaucrats to ensure that there were no mysterious 
increases during the time they were in public service.104  Those who failed to 
report assets could be barred from office, subject to approval from the new 
Constitutional Court.105  The Court could also remove politicians for viola-
tions of the law and did so on occasion, which led to some politicians being 
banned from office.106 
 
98. See supra Table 1.  Sometimes this is an appellate jurisdiction, as in Hungary, where the 
Court rules on appeals from the National Electoral Commission on the legality of particular 
questions subject to referenda.  EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW, DECISIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND EQUIVALENT BODIES AND THEIR EXECUTION (2001), http://www. 
venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDL-INF(2001)009-e.asp.  The following discussion of Thailand borrows 
heavily from Tom Ginsburg, Ancillary Powers of Constitutional Courts, in INSTITUTIONS AND 
PUBLIC LAW: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 225 (Tom Ginsburg & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2004). 
99. EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW, supra note 98. 
100. 1958 CONST. arts. 58–60 (Fr.). 
101. On Thailand, see Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Afterlife: The Continuing Impact of 
Thailand’s Post-political Constitution, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 83, 93 (2009), for a discussion of how 
constitutional mechanisms implemented by the 1997 Constitution that aimed to limit the authority 
of elected representatives remain evident despite the recent military coup. 
102. Id. at 93–94. 
103. Id. at 93. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 96. 
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A high-profile case arose in January 2001 when Thaksin Shinawatra, 
the billionaire-turned-politician who was the leading candidate for Prime 
Minister in the upcoming election, was found by the NCCC to have filed a 
false asset report.107  The Constitutional Court was put in a difficult position 
when Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party subsequently won the elections.108  In a 
divided decision that has been described as confused, the Court found that 
the false report had not been filed deliberately, and thereby allowed Thaksin 
to take the post of Prime Minister.109  Thaksin subsequently expanded his 
authority considerably, buying off members of the Court and other oversight 
institutions of the Constitution.110  Opposition to his rule led eventually to 
large-scale protests and a political stalemate culminating in a controversial 
election in 2006 that was boycotted by the opposition.111  Shortly thereafter, 
the highly respected King charged the country’s courts with resolving the 
dispute.112  The Court then turned, belatedly, against Thaksin and found that 
his reelection was invalid.113  In the fall of 2006, a military coup ousted 
Thaksin from power, and the new rulers disbanded the Constitutional Court, 
which was seen as insufficiently independent.114  This story illustrates the 
dangers for courts of involvement in electoral disputes: should they fail to 
pick the side that eventually prevails, they are likely to be blamed as 
ineffectual at best and partisan at worst. 
F. Summary and Implications 
Many of the ancillary powers we have discussed have involved policing 
the political process in some form or another.  Figure 5 illustrates the trends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id.; see also Peter Leyland, Thailand’s Constitutional Watchdogs: Dobermans, 
Bloodhounds or Lapdogs?, J. COMP. L., 2007 (Issue 2), at 151, 169 n.127 (discussing the Court’s 
“unusual” vote-counting system used in the case to reach a majority). 
110. Id. at 96–97. 
111. Id. at 97–98. 
112. Id. at 98. 
113. Id. 
114. Seth Mydans & Thomas Fuller, With Premier at U.N., Thai Military Stages Coup, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., Sept. 20, 2006, at 1. 
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Figure 5: Proportion of Constitutional Courts with Powers to Police the 
Political Process115 
Universe: Constitutions with Constitutional Courts (N = 121) 
 
Why are ancillary powers given to constitutional courts?  Perhaps it 
reflects a similar logic to the spread of judicial review itself: the need for 
political insurance in the face of uncertainty.  Constitutional designers know 
there will be political conflict down the road, but they cannot anticipate who 
will be on what side of the issues and may anticipate that they are not in the 
majority.  This will, ceteris paribus, lead them to empower a downstream 
actor who can fill gaps in the constitution and resolve disputes so as to 
maintain the system. 
Alternatively, the assignment of ancillary powers may simply reflect the 
willingness of constitutional designers to bundle functions in a single body as 
an economizing tactic.  An institution with a reputation for success is given 
further tasks.  Just as an ace pitcher is called on to pitch more innings than a 
middle reliever, one gives more tasks to an important and successful 
institution.  Of course, there are risks: using a good pitcher as both your ace 
and closer is tempting, but it can overburden the pitcher and ruin his arm. 
What are the implications of a ballooning job description for 
constitutional court justices?  On the practical level, does the expansion 
overextend the court’s resources and thus compromise more-central 
 
115. These powers include adjudication of (1) electoral disputes, (2) allegations of political 
party illegality, and (3) charges of impeachment for the executive(s) or members of the legislature. 
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functions?  If the U.S. Supreme Court has its hands full with a docket of 100 
cases a year, it seems fair to ask whether analogous courts in other countries 
can be burdened with that responsibility plus an additional five or six ancil-
lary tasks, as are some constitutional courts today.  This question requires 
inspection at closer range in particular countries, but it seems possible that 
the added functions—while certainly important—come into play only 
infrequently.  Just as Bush v. Gore116 was a singular case that shifted the U.S. 
Court’s agenda briefly, so too the ancillary tasks assigned constitutional 
courts may have only short-term consequences on workload.  However, Bush 
v. Gore reminds us that such cases can have important implications for the 
character and reputation of a court.  Recall that the basic paradigm of con-
stitutional review relies on the image of the court as interpreting the 
foundational text.  Some of the powers described above, such as evaluating 
the constitutionality of political parties, fit this scheme.  Others, such as certi-
fying states of emergency, involve factual determinations, while some, 
particularly disputes that arise in the context of elections, are more akin to 
pure ad hoc dispute resolution. 
Criticism of the rationales of courts in these cases is common precisely 
because there is a conflict between the image of the court as a neutral body 
basing a decision on preexisting norms and the social logic of the coordina-
tion problem at hand.  Bush v. Gore is perhaps the paradigm here.  Widely 
viewed as the most political of political decisions,117 the Court’s closely di-
vided vote substituted for the votes of the electorate.  The chief difference 
between an electorate of 100 million and an electorate of nine is that in the 
latter there are no ties.  What could be more activist or political? 
From the functional point of view, however, the decision looks quite 
different.  For Bush v. Gore is a prototypical case of pure dispute resolution.  
Two parties come before the Court.  Both prefer a resolution of some kind to 
continuing uncertainty.  Like Weber’s kadi under the tree,118 the Court was 
certainly not engaged in lawmaking of a real kind, as its own limiting 
 
116. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
117. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 
YALE L.J. 1407, 1408 (2001) (“Bush v. Gore was troubling because it suggested that the Court was 
motivated by a particular kind of partisanship, one much more narrow than the promotion of broad 
political principles through the development of constitutional doctrine.  The distinction is between 
the ‘high’ politics of political principle and the ‘low’ politics of partisan advantage.”); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore?, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3 (2002) 
(observing people’s acceptance of the fact “that the Court made political choices” in Bush v. Gore). 
118. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(“We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual 
expediency.”); MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 213 n.48 (Max 
Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954) (describing kadi as “a term of art to 
describe the administration of justice which is oriented not at fixed rules of a formally rational law 
but at the ethical, religious, political, or otherwise expediential postulates of a substantively rational 
law”). 
1456 Texas Law Review [Vol. 87:1431 
 
 
assertions on the implications of its equal protection analysis made clear.119  
Nor was the Court carrying out regime policies to exercise social control.  
There was no regime to serve—and that was of course the issue in the case.  
Rather, the Court was a neutral third resolving a coordination problem 
among the parties.  Here we see the basic social logic of dispute resolution at 
its apex. 
We illustrate this with a further detour into game theory to help 
illuminate the function of a court in these kinds of disputes.  The above 
description of coordination problems concerned “pure” coordination: Neither 
driver really cares which side of the road he or she drives on as long as he 
avoids the accident.120  The game in election disputes like Bush v. Gore is 
more akin to that of “chicken,” famous from the scene in the James Dean 
movie where two cars drive headfirst at each other to see who will be the first 
to swerve.121  Each party would prefer to play the aggressive strategy and 
refuse to swerve, but if both follow this first-best strategy, they will wind up 
in the collectively worst outcome of a head-on collision.  The task for each 
party is to convincingly demonstrate that he will not swerve, thereby 
inducing the other party to swerve.  To analogize to Bush v. Gore, there is 
only one presidency with two claimants.  Each party prefers that he be the 
one to occupy the office.  However, the most important thing is that some 
sort of resolution occur.  The costs to the constitutional order of continuing to 
fight exceed the costs of being the “loser.”  The trick is to figure out who will 
play the role of “loser” and back down from the confrontation.  Left to their 
own devices, the parties will not be able to coordinate their roles.  Each will 
try to express resolve to induce the other party to back down.122  The role of a 
constitutional court here is to point to one or the other contender and identify 
him as the “winner.”  Once a court identifies one party as a winner, the deci-
sion may become a self-enforcing focal point.  Gore’s perception of the 
likelihood of Bush’s backing down changed as soon as the Supreme Court 
announced its decision.  Whereas before the decision, Gore seemed to have a 
legitimate claim on the presidency and might have expected Bush to accede, 
after the decision Bush was unlikely to do so.  Gore could have stayed on, 
but the chances of Bush ever adopting the “swerve” strategy were greatly 
reduced. 
Note that this interpretation of electoral disputes as a game of chicken 
suggests that the Supreme Court can play a function independent of the 
quality of any particular justification that it offers.  The Supreme Court could 
have simply flipped a coin to decide Bush v. Gore to play this crucial 
 
119. See Bush, 538 U.S. at 109 (“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for 
the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”). 
120. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text. 
121. REBEL WITHOUT A CAUSE (Warner Bros. 1955). 
122. Cf. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 86, at 1235 (analogizing that when, for instance, 
two nations take adversarial positions, “each nation prefers to gain the territory by having the other 
side defer to its claim”). 
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function; had the Court simply pointed to Bush as the random winner, Gore 
would still have had to readjust his views as to the likelihood of Bush back-
ing down.  The particular reasoning offered, flawed as it was, was not the 
point.  Regardless of its rationale, the Court decision became focal for the 
two parties in seeking to coordinate their strategies.123 
Because any external source can provide a focal point in these kinds of 
disputes, there is no reason that a constitutional court must inherently exer-
cise this ancillary power.  In many constitutional schemes, the role of the 
constitutional court is limited to certain types of electoral disputes.  For 
example, in Albania, disputes over local government elections go to the 
ordinary courts, while disputes over parliamentary elections go to the con-
stitutional court.124  Nevertheless, the constitutional court can be a convenient 
third party to turn to in constitutional design, in part because it, like other 
courts, draws on the imagery of a neutral dispute resolver. 
IV. Tensions Between Lawmaking and Dispute Resolution 
So far we have moved on a spectrum all the way from the high-profile 
function of lawmaking in constitutional review toward simple dispute reso-
lution in ad hoc impeachment cases and electoral disputes.  We have thus 
come a long way from the conventional emphasis on the lawmaking function 
of courts.  The image we are left with is of a court that is an ad hoc decision 
maker, akin to Weber’s kadi under the tree or Shapiro’s Papuan with many 
pigs.125  The constitutional court helps powerful actors resolve coordination 
problems, and the particular justifications offered are of little import. 
Of course, one important feature of constitutional schemes is that 
everyone is a repeat player.  If we adopt as a hypothesis that courts seek to 
enhance their power and influence over time, then we must assume the court 
acts strategically not only in particular cases, as emphasized by Epstein and 
 
123. Interestingly, despite much criticism of the decision, the Court’s legitimacy as an 
institution was affected only very slightly by the decision.  See Cornell W. Clayton, The Supply and 
Demand Sides of Judicial Policy-Making (Or, Why Be So Positive About the Judicialization of 
Politics?), 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 80 (2002) (positing that the Court’s decision was 
justified); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of 
the Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32, 33 (2001) (“The Court’s action in Bush v. Gore was 
dramatic, subject to intense media coverage, and controversial, but the effects on public perceptions 
and knowledge of the Court were modest.”). 
124. Albanian electoral law provides for the judicial appeal of election results to the Electoral 
College of the Court of Appeals in Tirana, an eight person panel made up of specially selected 
appellate judges.  Electoral Code, Law No. 9087, §§ 162–163 (Alb.).  For elections involving 
members of the national assembly, however, the Albanian Constitution grants exclusive jurisdiction 
to the Constitutional Court.  KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SË SHQIPËRISË [KUSH. ALB.] 
[Constitution] art. 131(g), translated in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, 
supra note 11. 
125. See supra note 118 (discussing the term kadi); SHAPIRO, COURTS, supra note 20, at 6 (“In 
most societies, however, there seem to be instances in which it pays to choose a big man to do the 
tasks, whether a government official like the urban praetor or, as among the Papuans, the owner of 
many pigs.”). 
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Knight,126 but across different policy areas and cases calling on the exercise 
of different types of powers.  The court is a strategic actor over time, and 
hence will encounter a sequence of cases of various types. 
Here we see a tension emerge between the simple dispute-resolution 
role and the lawmaking function of an actor with policy preferences.  The 
dispute resolver’s neutrality with regard to a particular outcome may be 
compromised when the court needs to take long-term institutional considera-
tions into account.  The Court may not care, as an ideal matter, whether Bush 
or Gore wins the election, but in fact each Justice has real preferences about 
the ultimate direction of the Court in the next presidential term and may thus 
have preferences about which candidate should be, for example, appointing 
new Justices.  More importantly, the Court must be mindful of its own insti-
tutional position.  Creating an angry loser, one which by definition has 
sufficient power to be a force in national politics, may mean creating a 
permanent enemy. 
This may lead courts in such circumstances to act rather more 
cautiously than they appear to.  In the Thai example, the Court may have 
sought to avoid a fight with an incoming political majority with strong 
support, but this ultimately cost the Court when the opposition staged a 
coup.127  In the Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian Supreme Court required a 
new election in a disputed presidential contest, but at least some analysts 
believed that it did so only after the major political forces had reached a 
consensus that a new election was the appropriate course.128 
Constitutional designers have quite consciously given courts the wide 
array of powers described in this Article.  They have done so in part because 
the global success of judicial review has given constitutional courts a reputa-
tion as effective institutions.129  Constitutional review creates a kind of stock 
of capital that designers seek to draw on to help resolve impasses in the 
political system, such as those that occur in impeachment and election 
disputes.  The risk is that, as they are drawn into explicitly political conflicts, 
courts risk drawing down this stock of capital.  This risk is no doubt 
particularly acute in new democracies. 
In the context of ordinary dispute resolution, we have long been told 
that much of the structure and image of adjudication are designed to deal 
with the problem of the appearance of bias toward the winner of the 
 
126. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 31, at 12–13. 
127. See supra notes 107–14 and accompanying text. 
128. See, e.g., Adrian Karatnycky, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
Mar.−Apr. 2005, at 35, 45−46 (documenting the Ukraine Supreme Court’s decision while 
acknowledging that, before the Court did so, the Parliament had already met and declared the prior 
poll invalid). 
129. See GINSBURG, supra note 5, at 26 (“[J]udicial review has a reputation for effective 
minoritarianism that makes designers particularly likely to adopt it.”). 
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dispute.130  Appeals play this function, as do judges’ reliance on the image of 
applying preexisting neutral principles.  Many of these techniques are un-
available to constitutional courts.  There is no higher court to appeal to; and 
oftentimes the very rationale for designating a special constitutional court is a 
recognition of the fact that the function is in part political in nature rather 
than technical and legal.131  All constitutional courts have, in the end, is the 
constitutional text and the notion that founding principles are dictating 
decisions.  In the end, then, the image of judicial review is central to their 
political success, even when in practice constitutional courts are exercising a 
wider array of powers. 
The dangers and tradeoffs are illustrated in the well-known story of the 
first Russian Constitutional Court in the Communist Party Case of 1992.  The 
Russian Court, created in the late Gorbachev period, was seen to be a central 
embodiment of the rule of law and the “new” Russia.132  Its primary role 
emerged as mediating disputes between the parliament and President.133  
When Boris Yeltsin, in a series of decrees after the 1991 coup attempt, dis-
banded the Communist Party and seized its property and assets,134 the 
Communists challenged the decrees as exceeding presidential power.135  This 
prompted a cross-petition by opponents of the Communist Party, who 
invoked the Court’s ancillary power to determine the party’s legality and 
constitutional status.136  The two petitions were joined by the Chairman of the 
Court, Valery Zorkin.137 
The Court was faced with a difficult situation.  It could uphold the 
President’s actions, even though he did not follow the relevant legal proce-
dures for banning political associations, or it could strike them and side with 
the anticonstitutional Communists who had supported the coup.  Neither 
 
130. See SHAPIRO, COURTS, supra note 20, at 2 (describing a “triad” in which two conflicting 
persons call upon a third for assistance in reaching a resolution and noting that “[a] substantial 
portion of the total behavior of courts in all societies can be analyzed in terms of attempts to prevent 
the triad from breaking down into two against one”). 
131. See KOMMERS, supra note 61, at 4, 8 (differentiating judicial review, which involves the 
review of the constitutionality of legislation, from constitutional review, which resolves political 
disputes between branches and levels of government); see also id. at 28, 27–29 (discussing the 
German Constitutional Court’s caseload and noting the “thin line between law and politics trod by 
the court” in cases of abstract judicial review, which are “almost always initiated by a political party 
on the short end of a legislative vote in the federal parliament or by the national or a state 
government challenging an action of another level of government controlled by an opposing 
political party or coalition of parties”). 
132. AHDIEH, supra note 74, at 78. 
133. Id. at 50. 
134. Id. at 41–42. 
135. Id. at 80–81. 
136. Id. at 81. 
137. Id.  The legal grounds of the case were complicated and better elaborated elsewhere.  
Suffice it to say that the case featured some bizarre arguments, such as when Yeltsin’s team argued 
that the decree to ban a political association was legal under a 1932 Stalinist decree that permitted 
the Executive to undertake such action.  Id. 
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option appeared particularly attractive.  Thus caught, the Court attempted to 
split the difference by finding a mediate solution.  In a decision published on 
November 30, 1992, the Court upheld Yeltsin’s decrees against the organs of 
the national Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but not against its local 
bodies.138  This decision provoked disappointment on all sides and failed to 
resolve the governmental crisis.139  Court Chairman Zorkin then sought to 
negotiate a compromise document between Yeltsin and the parliament.140  
This constitutional compromise marked the deep involvement of the Court, 
and Zorkin in particular, in the realm of pure politics as opposed to law.  The 
image of the Court as a neutral, technical body devoted to the law was 
dashed.  When Yeltsin dispensed with the compromise and announced a 
decree granting himself emergency powers in March 1993, the Court issued 
an opinion declaring the actions unconstitutional, even before the decree was 
issued.141  Within months, Yeltsin dissolved the parliament and suspended 
the Court’s operation.142  It was not reconvened until February 1995, with 
reduced powers.143  In particular, it lost the ancillary power to declare parties 
unconstitutional—the very power that had sparked the crisis in the first 
place.144 
The Russian story illustrates the dilemma of courts exercising ancillary 
powers.  Despite the handwringing in the academy about the countermajori-
tarian difficulty of judicial lawmaking, it was ancillary powers and the 
extension of the Court’s Chairman into an explicitly political role, rather than 
lawmaking, that led to the demise of the first Russian Constitutional Court.  
To the extent that they rely on the dispute-resolution logic of all triadic third 
parties, ancillary powers can facilitate resolution of major political conflicts 
and coordination problems.  But the further the court gets away from its 
paradigm task of review based on interpretation of a fundamental text, the 
more it may find itself acting in a fashion that undermines its own 
legitimacy.  Furthermore, the need to act strategically over a long series of 
cases that call on various powers of the court means that sometimes “pure” 
dispute resolution will be compromised by political expediency.  Ancillary 
powers, then, are some, but only some, of the tools the court must use to 
build up its political role over time. 
 
138. Id. at 82. 
139. See id. (recounting the political exploits initiated by both parties and the seemingly 
tenuous position the Court attempted but failed to defend). 
140. Id. at 86. 
141. Id. at 87.  In fact, the decree never materialized and the opinion was only an advisory opinion.  
Id. at 87–88. 
142. Sergey Pashin, A Second Edition of the Constitutional Court, 3 E. EUR. CONST. REV., 
Summer–Fall 1994, at 82, 82. 
143. AHDIEH, supra note 74, at 149; Pashin, supra note 142, at 83. 
144. See AHDIEH, supra note 74, at 149 (discussing the passage in 1994 of Article 125 of the 
Russian Constitution, which reestablished the Court); KONST. RF art. 125 (enumerating the current 
powers of the Constitutional Court, which no longer include the ability to declare parties 
unconstitutional). 
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V. Conclusion 
The recent weight of comparative constitutional scholarship has focused 
nearly exclusively on the power of constitutional review.  As a result, the 
dominant image of courts is that of lawmaker, creating rules through dia-
logue with political branches.  When one examines the full array of powers 
explicitly granted and utilized by constitutional courts, however, a somewhat 
different picture emerges.  The ancillary functions highlight how constitu-
tional courts operate as triadic figures, drawing on the basic social logic of 
courts identified by Shapiro. 
This mix of “court-like” features and quasi-legislative features is neither 
surprising nor inherently problematic.  Like other features of modern mixed 
government, the notion of “pure” governmental functions implicit in 
separation-of-powers formalism remains a fantasy.  “Executive” admini-
strative agencies adjudicate cases and write rules; legislatures hold hearings 
and pass private bills; and courts both make law and resolve disputes. 
Nevertheless, it is worth sounding a note of caution.  The urge to 
transfer new functions to successful institutions is an understandable one for 
constitutional designers.  The prestige of constitutional courts in general, 
their reputation for neutrality, and their reliance on political legitimacy as the 
primary mechanism for enforcement of their decisions creates an incentive to 
give them complex political problems to resolve.  There is, however, a risk 
that constitutional courts will be drawn into inherently unwinnable zero-sum 
conflicts, which require deft maneuvering and skillful action.  In new democ-
racies, at least, it is not obvious that the courts themselves will always be up 
to the task.  The deaths of constitutional courts in Russia and Thailand 
illustrate the risks. 
